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9. Three Questions about Corporate
Codes: Problematizations,
Authorizations and the Public/Private
Divide
Stepan Wood
INTRODUCTION
In recent years codes of corporate conduct have stirred a great deal of
interest and controversy. This is a function, in part, of a growing conviction
that many contemporary problems - the environmental crisis, globalization, ;
etc. - increasingly challenge or exceed the capacities of conventional
governmental institutions___to respond to them effectively. Interest in codes
and the accompanying controversy over their place in the governance of
business are likely to intensify as the search continues for solutions to the
puzzle of how to govern actors and processes that increasingly seem to
elude regulation. There are not likely to be any simple solutions to this
puzzle. One thing seems clear however: experimentation with and
disputation over codes of corporate conduct are likely to continue for the
foreseeable future.
This chapter is not an attempt to forecast the future of codes of corporate
conduct. Nor is it an attempt to set out a normative vision for the future role
of codes in the governance of business, society, environment or state. My
goal in this chapter is more limited: to consider the questions we should be
asking about codes as their role in the governance of corporate conduct
unfolds. While the list of such questions is potentially unlimited, I would
like to single out three that have been largely overlooked in scholarly and
practical debates. They are:

1. What are the problems for which corporate codes are offered as
solutions?
2. How is the authority of codes and the actors who promulgate them
245
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established?
3. Is it useful to think about codes in terms of an opposition between
public and private?

If these ·questions sound odd to those familiar with contemporary debates
about corporate codes, it is because they are intended to excavate some of
the foundations of these debates rather than entering the debates on their
own terms. I believe that asking these questions will help to deepen our
understanding of corporate codes at a time when experimentation with their
use in the governance of business, state, society and environment is
intensifying.
In this chapter I discuss codes of corporate conduct in terms of
'governance'. As I use the term, 'governance' refers broadly to any and all
calculated efforts to steer or direct the conduct of the self or others. It also
refers to the overall effects that emerge in socio-political systems as a result
of these interacting efforts (see generally, Foucault 1991; Burchell, Gordon
and Miller 1991; Rose and Miller 1992; Kooiman 1993; Hunt and Wickham
1994; Rhodes 1994, 1996; Rosenau 1997; Dean 1999; Rose 1999). In this
view 'governors' include not just state actors but authorities of all kinds,
from schoolteachers to psychiatrists, from factory bosses to fashion
designers. The targets of governance are equally heterogeneous, ranging
from the self, to others, to entire populations, societies, states or
international systems (Rutherford 1999). Governance includes what we
traditionally think of as 'government' - states, legislatures, _government
agencies, courts, etc. - but also all the other sites in the world where efforts
to exercise authority are undertaken (see Rosenau 2002, p. 71).
There has recently been a massive surge of interest in governance
understood in these broad terms. This interest is found in debates about selforganizing networks (for example, Rhodes 1994, 1996), socio-cybernetic
systems (for example, Kooiman 1993), 'governmentality' (for example,
Foucault 1991), regulatory reform (for example, Osborne and Gaebler
1992), 'governance without government' (for example, Rosenau and
Czempiel 1992), 'good governance' (for example, World Bank 1992) and
international or global governance (for example, Rosenau and Czempiel
1992; Commission on Global Governance 1995; Hewson and Sinclair 1999;
Held and McGrew 2002; Wilkinson and Hughes 2002). It is found in a
renewed fascination with decentralized and non-state systems of authority
·in international studies, law and the social sciences generally. And of course
it is found in the widespread contemporary fascination and experimentation
with 'corporate social responsibility', of 'Yhich codes of corporate conduct
are a leading example.

;

·~
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Codes of corporate conduct are concerned fundamentally with
governance. They seek to govern the conduct not just of corporations and
their managers, but - more subtly - a whole range of other actors including
investors, workers, customers, suppliers, creditors, insurers, competitors,
consumers, citizens, local communities, 'civil society' organizations,
legislators, regulators, inspectors, prosecutors, judges and international
organizations. Examining codes as instances of governance is a useful way
to explore their manifold dimensions and implications.

ILLUSTRATION: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
1
SYSTEMS (EMSs) AND EMS STANDARDS
Throughout this essay I will use the example of environmental inap.agement
systems (EMSs) to illustrate what it might mean to examine codes of
corporate conduct as instances of governance. Let me start by introducing
EMSs and the ISO 14000 EMS standards.
An environmental management system (EMS) is a structured framework
of policies and procedures which enables an organization to identify and
manage its environmental impacts in a systematic way. Most EMSs are .
based on the cyclical 'Plan-Do-Check-Act' (PDCA) model. The PDCA
cycle is intended to result in an upward spiral of 'continual improvement' in
which the quality of an organization's management system and
environmental performance are steadily improved.
The management systems approach first became popular in business in
the 1970s and 1980s as part of the 'total quality management' movement. It
spread quickly beyond quality assurance to other management fields,
including environment and occupational health and safety. By the early
1990s many business firms, management consultants, consumer groups and
standardization bodies were interested in developing uniform standards for
environmental management systems. National standardization bodies in
several countries began to develop voluntary EMS standards. The European
Communities followed shortly with their own voluntary Eco-Management
and Audit Scheme (EMAS) which took effect in 1995 (Council of the
European Communities 1993).
Even before any of these initiatives were finalized, the International
Organization for Standardization (IS0), 2 the premier source of global
technical standards for business, got into the game. Established in 1946, the
ISO's mandate is to promote the development of standards with the goal of
facilitating international trade and fostering intellectual, scientific,
technological and economic cooperation. It is a federation of approximately
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one hundred national standards-setting bodies, representing virtually all the
advanced industrial countries, the principal countries of the former Soviet
bloc and the larger or more advanced developing countries. The majority of
participants in ISO standards development are drawn from the industries
that make use of the standards. The expense of participating in this work
makes it difficult for many developing country, consumer and
environmental representatives to participate effectively.
Standards· quietly permeate every aspect of our everyday lives. They
govern everything from screw tbread·sizes to bicycle helmet design. For all
their pervasiveness, however, standardization bodies and their standards
keep a remarkably low profile. Many people have heard of ISO
photographic film speed ratings. Some have been momentarily curious
when passing a highway billboard declaring a factory to be 'ISO 900 I
Certified'. Some consumers may recognize and feel vaguely reassured by
standardization bodies' symbols on consumer products. But this is the
extent of most people's knowledge of ISO or other standardization bodies.
These influential yet little-known bodies have gone almost entirely
unnoticed ip the recent wave of public controversy and grassroots protest
regarding globalization and corporate power that has engulfed the major
intergovernmental trade and financial institutions. Nonetheless voluntary
·standards and the organizations that develop them have significant
implications for corporate conduct, environmental protection, economic
development, politics and governance.
··
In the early 1990s, responding to requests from consumer groups,
industry and the organizers of the 1992 Earth Summit, ISO decided to take
a leadership role in the development of global standards for corporate
environmental management. In 1993 it established a new Technical
Committee, TC 207, for this purpose. From the beginning ISO's work in
this field was characterized as an important part of global industry's
contribution to the goal of 'sustainable development'. The approximately
twenty-five standards so far developed by TC 207, known as the ISO 14000
series, address various subjects including environmental management
systems, environmental performance evaluation, life cycle ·analysis and
ecolabelling.
Two EMS standards, ISO 14001 and 14004, form the core of the ISO
14000 series. ISO 1400 I is a 'specification standard', prescribing; in
concise terms, EMS requirements that may be audited for purposes of third
party certification or self-declaration (ISO 1996a). ISO 14004 provides
more detailed guidance on the design and implementation of EMSs (ISO
1996b). Both are voluntary in the sense that individual organizations choose
for themselves whether or not to implement them. Revisions of ISO 14001
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and 14004 were launched in 2000, but are not supposed to result in
fundamental changes to either standard.
From the beginning the scope of the ISO 14000 series was defined to
exclude environmental performance standards. As a result, unlike many
other voluntary environmental codes, ISO 14001 and 14004 do not require
or encourage any particular level of environmental performance. Rather
they provide a procedural framework within which organizations can set
and achieve whatever environmental performance goals they decide.
An EMS based on ISO 14001or14004 has five main elements. First,
organization's top management must define an environmental policy and
make it available to the public. The policy should include commitments to
'continual improvement', 'prevention of pollution' and compliance with
relevant environmental laws and 'other requirements' to which the
organization subscribes, such as voluntary codes of conduct or trade
association membership rules. While 'continual improvement' is
understood outside ISO as involving improvement of environmental
performance, ISO 14001 and 14004 define it primarily in terms of
improvement of the management system. While 'prevention of pollution' is
usually understood as the reduction of pollution or waste at ·source, ISO
14001 and 14004 define it to include end-of-pipe pollution control. Finally .
some EMS professionals interpret the 'commitment to compliance' to '
require actual compliance with all applicable laws while others understand
it only as requiring the organization to have in place an effective system for
dealing with noncompliance.
The second element of an ISO EMS is a planning process. An
organization must put in place procedures to identify all the environmental
aspects of its activities, products or services that it can control and
influence; to determine which of those aspects have or can have significant
environmental impacts; and to identify the legal and 'other' requirements
that apply to its environmental aspects. It must set environmental objectives
and targets, taking into consideration, among other things, the views of
'interested parties'.3 Finally it must develop management programmes
which specify how, when and by whom objectives and targets are to be
achieved.
Implementation and operation make up the third main element of an ISO
EMS. The organization must define roles and responsibilities required for
the operation of the EMS and communicate them to the relevant people. It
must appoint a management representative to oversee the EMS and report
to top management on its performance. It must ensure that the EMS has
adequate resources. It must ensure that any environmentally significant
operations are carried out under controlled conditions to avoid deviations

an
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from its environmental policy, objectives or targets. It must ensure the
competence and awareness of all personnel performing tasks that can cause
significant environmental impacts. It must ensure that key aspects of the
EMS are documented and that all EMS documents are properly controlled.
It must have emergency preparedness and response procedures. Finally it
must have procedures for internal communication about environmental
management. As to external communication, the organization need not
disclose any information externally beyond its environmental policy, nor
must it establish any mechanisms for consultation with external audiences
beyond receiving and responding to complaints or inquiries. It may refuse
to disclose information about its environmental impacts, objectives and
performance, as well as other information about its EMS. In these respects
ISO 14001 and 14004 run counter to the contemporary trend in industry to
acknowledge the value of transparency and public participation in
environmental matters. 4
The fourth major element of an EMS is checking and corrective action.
The organization must put in place procedures to monitor and measure all
the key characteristics of its operations and activities that can have a
significant impact on the environment, and to evaluate periodically its
compliance with environmental legal requirements. It must have procedures
for investigating failures of the EMS, mitigating any resulting
·environmental impacts and taking corrective and preventive action. Finally
it must conduct periodic internal audits of the EMS. 5
The final element of an ISO EMS is management review. Top
management must periodically review the EMS 'to ensure its continuing
suitability, adequacy and effectiveness' (ISO 14001, clause 4.6).
Management review is intended to result, where appropriate, in changes to
the EMS. It closes the PDCA circle and fosters continual improvement.
EMSs have.spread rapidly through both the private and public sectors in
recent years. Wliile ISO 14001 and 14004 are not the only EMS standards,
they have quickly emerged as the most popular. The number of ISO 14001
registrations worldwide has grown at a remarkable pace since 1996,
reaching almost 50000 by December 2002 (ISO 2003g; see also
International Network for Environmental Management n.d.).6 Some
multinational . corporations,
including some
major automobile
manufacturers, now require their suppliers to have ISO 1400 I-style EMSs
in place. Public authorities in numerous jurisdictions have begun to
~corporate EMSs into their governance strategies (Coglianese and Nash
2001a; Wood 2002-03, 2003). Nonetheless whether EMS standards will
become requirements for private- or public-sector organizations or will fade
·
into irrelevance remains to be seen.
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Three Questions about Codes
With this overview of EMSs and EMS standardization in mind, I tum to the
three questions I posed in the introduction: (1) What are the problems for
which corporate codes are offered as solutions? (2) How is the authority of
corporate codes and the actors who promulgate them established? (3) Can
we make sense of corporate codes in terms of an opposition between public
and private?

WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS FOR WHICH CORPORATE
CODES ARE OFFERED AS SOLUTIONS?
Codes of corporate conduct are typically understood as attempts to solve
problems, from negative brand image to human rights abuses. It does not
take much imagination, however, to see that governance, through codes of
corporate conduct or otherwise, is more than a problem-solving enterprise.
To govern is not just to attempt to solve problems, it is also to invent them.
Problematizations
Problematizations can be understood as those moments in which particular
aspects of human conduct come to be viewed as problematic and in need of
intervention (Dean 1999, pp. 27-8~ Rose 1999, pp. 20-22).
Problematizations underpin all efforts to govern human conduct. They are
present whenever any aspect of personal, collective or institutional conduct
comes to be viewed as problematic and in need of intervention, from
obesity to police brutality to corporate accounting practices. Yet they tend
to be taken for granted in public and scholarly debates about codes of
corporate conduct and governance generally. While plenty of attention is
devoted to the question of whether and how corporate codes might or might
not solve given problems, not enough attention is paid to the question of
how particular aspects of conduct come to be experienced as problematic in
the first place.
Problematizations have effects. They provide a kind of intellectual
machinery for rendering reality thinkable, rationalizable and hence
governable (Gordon 1980, p. 245; Rose and Miller 1992, p. 179). They put
in place a specific way of knowing spaces, persons, problems and objects in
relation to which governance projects can be articulated (Rose 1999, pp. 267). Not only do they defme what appears to be a coherent problem tropical deforestation, sustainable development, terrorism, etc. - they
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condition the field of possible interventions upon that problem and the
range of authorities or institutions best suited to make these interventions
(cf. Hajer 1995, pp. 62-3). They can alter what is experienced as 'out of
place', for example transforming smoke stacks from signs of progress to
signs of trouble (ibid., p. 64). They presuppose governed 'subjects' in
specific ways: as responsible citizens with rights and duties, consumers
with preferences, members of a flock to be led, human resources to be
exploited, stakeholders to be consulted, etc. (see Burchell 1991, p. 120;
Rose 1999, pp. 40-47; Rose and Miller 1992, p. 179; Dean 1999, pp. 3233). By privileging particular problem definitions, they can marginalize
alternative ways of conceiving and addressing problems and inhibit
contestation on these matters. Finally the problematizations that emerge as
authoritative tend to be those which define problems that governing
authorities and institutions can handle and for which solutions can be found
(Hajer 1995, p. 15). Problematizations thus have powerful implications in
terms of which governance projects are pursued, by whom, how, to what
ends and with what effects.
Problematizations form part of the collective bodies of knowledge, belief
and opinion·in which we are immersed (Dean 1999, p. 16). These bodies of
thought have been studied under various rubrics, including culture (for
example, Fischer and Hajer 1999), ideology (for example, Althusser 1984,
Gramsci 1971), rationality (for example, Weber 1976; Lash and Whimster
1987) and 'mentality' (for example, Foucault 1991). Whatever label is used
to describe them, these bodies of thought condition what it is possible to
think and hence how it is possible to act. They quickly become taken for
granted, submerged and unthinkable (Dean 1999, p. 16; Fischer and Hajer
1999). A central task for analysis is thus to reconstruct the often taken-forgranted problems to which various governance schemes, such as codes of
corporate ethics, pose themselves as solutions (Rose 1999, p. 58).
Finally problematization is a reflexive activity in that it addresses not just
the conduct of governed subjects but that of governors themselves. The
study of governance needs to concern itself with these reflexive moments
when authorities of various kinds, from corporate managers to human rights
activists to government officials, pose questions about how governors ought
to govern. How should governors conduct themselves, toward what ends
should they govern, how can they know what they need to know in order to
govern, how can they govern better, how should they relate to other
governing authorities, to whom should they be accountable and by whom
will governed subjects accept being governed? Questions like these are
central to all efforts to govern human conduct (for example, Foucault 1991,
p. 87; Rose and Miller 1992, p. 177; Dean l999, pp. 27-8). To study codes
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of corporate conduct is to concern ourselves centrally with how governance
itself is conceived and addressed as a problem.

The Problematizations of Environmental Management Systems
The problem of environmental degradation
EMS discourse assumes explicitly that the main problem behind
environmental degradation is the failure of organizational management
systems (for example, ISO 1996a, Introduction; Wolfe 1997; Hillary 1997;
Sheldon 1997a). Typical management system failures include a lack of
clearly defined responsibilities, inadequate supervision, commufilcation
breakdowns, inadequate planning, lack of standard procedures, inadequate
emergency preparedness, poor training; inadequate equipment maintenance,
inadequate monitoring and lack of follow-up when problems are detected
(for example, Gunningham 1997-98, p. 353).
There is much to be said for this framing of the problem. Certainly
management failures such as inadequate planning, training or monitoring
may cause or contribute to many environmental harms. Being against a
systematic approach sounds like being in favour of a haphazard or cavalier
approach to environmental risks. But as a general diagnosis of the problem .
of the environmental impacts of industrial society, this account is severely
limited.
First, it ignores the possibility, urged by many environmentalists, that the
problem lies in the activities, products, services, technologies or substances
that generate environmental risks and harms. EMS discourse resolutely
avoids the question of whether certain activities, substances or technologies
- such as genetically modified organisms, persistent toxic substances or the
transportation of oil by supertanker to feed a seemingly insatiable demand
for fossil fuels - pose intolerable risks to human or ecosystem health.
Second, to problematize environmental harm in terms of the inadequacy
of organizations' management systems deflects attention from the
possibility that the system of industrial capitalism itself may be part of the
problem. Of course EMS discourse acknowledges that industrial society has
produced serious environmental problems.7 It does not, however, view the
environmental crisis as posing a fundamental challenge to the institutions of
industrial society, as some versions of environmental discourse insist
Rather the discourse portrays the environmental crisis as more or less under
control and robust management systems as one of the keys to itS resolution
(for example, Sheldon 1997b, p. 12; Cascio 1996c, p. 25). The central
contemporary challenge and goal for industrial society, in this view, is
'sustainable development'~ Of course substantial reforms will be required to
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achieve this goal, but the basic point is clear. Rather than posing a
fundamental threat to industrial society, the environmental crisis is seen as
presenting an opportunity for its renewal (Hajer 1995). In this regard, far
from offering a novel perspective, EMS discourse reinforces the dominant
'eco-modernist' mentalities of contemporary environmental regulation
(Hajer 1995; Fischer and Hajer 1999).
Third, EMS discourse problematizes pollution and waste as avoidable
costs rather than inevitable side effects of doing business. In this 'win-win'
view, environmental protection saves money and enhances profitability,
competitiveness, reputation, relations with regulators and so on (for
example, Dodds 1997, p. 27; Hortensius and Barthel 1997, p. 19; Wolfe
1997, p. 15; Crognale 1999, p. 2; Coglianese and Nash 200lb, p. 11). This
attitude is useful insofar as it challenges conventional beliefs that pollution
is a cheap way to externalize the social costs of production or that
environmental protection is a net cost that must be imposed externally on
business by the state. On the other hand it tends to discount the considerable
body of evidence and opinion suggesting that environmental protection and
business success often do not go hand in hand.8
Fourth, by insisting that management system failures are the primary
problem behind poor environmental performance, EMS discourse deflect:S
attention from individuals. This is valuable insofar as it discredits the tactic
of laying the blame for environmental harm at the feet of a few individuals
whose conduct may have been the immediate trigger for the harm. Exxon,
for example, mainly blamed the ship's drunken captain for the 1989 Exxon
Valdez disaster. Similarly the Ontario government .blamed the local water
utility operators for a deadly water contamination episode in the town of
Walkerton in 2000. Certainly a focus on management systems discredits
such scapegoat tactics and redirects attention toward often serious systemic
9
problems. But it deflects attention away from the question of the personal
responsibility of other individuals: the top corporate executives and
government leaders who deliberately place low priority on environmental
protection, resist higher environmental standards or lie, obfuscate, bribe,
intimidate and obstruct when their environmental conduct is questioned.
Sadly such conduct by top corporate or government officials plays a part in
many environmental disasters (see, for example, Palast 2003 on the Exxon
Valdez incident and O'Connor 2002 on Walkerton). Rather than
problematizing these individual choices or the socio-political contexts that
enable and foster them, EMSs assume, indeed rely upon, the good faith of
top managers. 10
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The problem of environmental governance
Problematizations do not just devise problems, they also predispose how
these problems ought to be governed and by whom. Conceiving the main
problem behind poor corporate environmental performance as a
management system failure leads to a particular set of prescriptions about
how to govern the environment.
First, EMS discourse problematizes the environmental crisis largely as a
question of managerial technique, to be dealt with through the application
of rational planning processes, objective technical expertise, standard
operating procedures, emergency preparedness and training and motivation
. of individual personnel.
Second, these managerial techniques ought to be employed, so the logic
goes, in light of the preferences and demands of actors in the marketplace
(for example, Cascio 1996b; Crognale 1999; Coglianese and Nash 200lb,
pp. 7-9). The firms that produce environriiental harms should choose
whether to implement an EMS and what level of environmental
performance to pursue largely in response to market signals from
customers, suppliers, consumers, competitors, creditors and investors.
Consumers of environmental harms, or of the goods and services associated
with those harms, ought to determine autonomously the harm they find
acceptable by rewarding or punishing firms in the marketplace.
Third, EMSs problematize environmental degradation as a matter that
exceeds the capacity of conventional governmental institutions (for
example, Elliott 1994; Orts 1995; Cascio 1996a; Robt-Arriaza 1995a;
Hillary 1997; O'Laoire 1997; Reiley 1997; Balikov and Cavanaugh 1997;
Gunningham 1997-98; Lally 1998; Taylor 1998, 1999; Morrison, Cushing,
Day and Speir 2000; Murray 1999; Pezzoli 2000; Stenzel 2000; Kollman
and Prakash 2001; Coglianese and Nash 200 la). States, law and the
interstate. system are understood to have inherently limited capacity to
respond effectively to contemporary crises. There is a widespread sense that
they have failed to deliver the hoped-for environmental and social
improvements or have achieved improvements at excessive cost.
'Command' regulation and direct service delivery by the state are seen as
already having reached or exceeded their limits in many cases.
Conventional regulation is portrayed as sclerotic, inefficient, costly, rigid,
complicated, near-sighted, reactive, piecemeal, backlogged, adversarial and
coercive (for example, Orts 1995; Cascio 1996b; Reiley 1997; Sheldon
1997b, p. 14; Lally 1998; Crognale 1999; Murray 1999; Pezzoli 2000;
Stenzel 2000; Coglianese and Nash 200lb, pp. 7-9).
Finally the environmental crisis is conceived as a problem that requires
the innovativeness only business can provide. States simply lack the
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resources and competence to dictate in detail how the business processes
that pose environmental risks ought to be designed (Cascio 1996b, p. 2).
Business is in a unique position to generate knowledge and innovation that
will contribute to a sustainable future. Rather than being part of the
problem, as 'conventional' environmentalists and regulators might suppose,
business is an indispensable part of the solution. Environmental
management systems, in particular, are portrayed as having the potential to
foster . cleaner production, greater environmental protection, a
transformation of corporate culture, progress toward sustainable
development and a constructive new partnership with both government and
the public (for example, ISO 14001, Introduction; Wolfe 1992; Cascio
1996b; Cascio, Woodside and Mitchell 1996, p. 71; Hortensius and Barthel
1997, p. 32; Gunningham 1997-98, p. 418; Crognale 1999, pp. 2-27;
Stenzel 2000). EMSs represent, for many of their proponents, an
innovative, flexible, consensual and proactive approach that promises to
transform or at least complement conventional environmental governance
(for example, Orts 1995; Gunningham 1997-98; Lally 1998; Stenzel 2000,
pp. 287-95).
Conclusion

As we look to the future of codes of corporate conduct, we need to
investigate the problematizations on the basis of which these efforts at
governance are undertaken. In the case of EMSs, environmental
degradation is problematized iii a way that deflects any fundamental
questioning of the institutions of industrial society, Including corporations,
markets, techno~science and a growth-oriented model of economic
progress. ~y conceptualizing the environmental crisis as a matter for
managerial te<?hnique and entrepreneurial innovation rather than a
manifestation of the pathological character of industrial society, and by
· framing environmental protection, corporate prosperity and sustainable
development as 'win-win' propositions, the problematizations on which
EMSs are based predispose the environmental problem toward a technomanagerialist, incrementalist, self-regulatory mode of governance. In the
process they ignore or marginalize a range of alternative problematizations.
that have played prominent roles in the modem environmental movement.
Moreover in these respects, the problematizations of EMSs more or less
duplicate and reinforce the very mentalities of contemporary environmental
policy from which they purport to be fundamental departures.
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HOW IS THE AUTHORITY OF CODES AND THE
ACTORS WHO PROMULGATE THEM ESTABLISHED?
'To govern, one could say, is to be condemned to seek an authority for
one's authority', writes Nikolas Rose (Rose 1999, p. 27). While some
governors seek to enforce their authority with the threat or use of violence,
most recognize that it.is less costly and in the long·run more effective if
those who are governed acknowledge, to some extent, the governor's
authority to govern them. Authorities are thus drawn perpetually to
establish the authority for their authority. Such efforts include appeals to
truth, justice, fairness, neutrality, objectivity, expertise, custom, consent, the
will of the people, the will of God, etc. Certain institutions and discourses,
such as those of science and law, purport to combine several of these
features and as such play important roles in strategies for the authorization
of authority in contemporary life (for example, Santos 2002).
Authorizations
In contemporary debates about codes of corporate conduct and in political
thought generally, the problem of authority is often reduced to the problem ..
of legitimacy. What makes particular institutions or exercises of authority.·
legitimate or illegitimate? Does reliance on scientific or technocratic
expertise run the risk of a 'democracy deficie? Are codes of conduct
developed by and for business illegitimate? These questions lead to a whole
range of debates about the credibility, accountability, transparency, fairness,
representativeness and effectiveness of codes and the processes and
. institutions through which they are developed and applied.
These are important questions, but I suggest we should be asking a
somewhat different set of questions about the problem of authority. Rather
than asking whether codes or the processes through which they are
developed and applied are legitimate, we should investigate how particular
authorities seek to establish their own authority and the authority of the
codes they advocate. I am interested in what might be termed the
authorization of authority (Rose and Valverde 1998) rather than its
legitimacy per se. Authorizations, in this sense, encompass all the ways in
which authorities of various kinds seek to establish their authority and
secure respect for it. An investigation of such authorizations promises to
reveal more about codes of corporate conduct than a mere evaluation of
their legitimacy could.
Authorizations are closely related to problematizations. Recall that
problematizations not only define problems, they do so in ways that lend
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themselves to particular kinds of interventions by particular kinds of
authorities. Problemati.zation is as much about authorizing certain
authorities to govern as it is about defining problems. Several aspects of the
problematizations I discussed earlier could also be understood as
authorizations: the appeal to managerial technique and market choice; the
confidence in the capacity of business to devise solutions to environmental
problems; and the corresponding lack of faith in the governance institutions
of the state. Problemati.zation is an important element in strategies for
establishing, consolidating or challenging the authority of particular
authorities.
One of the most common authorization tactics is to delineate a distinctive
domain within which an authority purports to be authoritative. The notion
of sovereignty was consolidated in the early modem period to delineate the
territorial domain within which the emerging nation state would wield
supreme authority. Many religious authorities seek to define their authority
in terms of a sacred or spiritual domain. Expert disciplines such as the
sciences, in turn, carve out specialized fields of knowledge and endeavour
within which their authority can be asserted. One of the central tasks of
these efforts at authorization is to delineate the proper domains, tasJ,cs and
limits of different authorities: to define zones in which particular authorities
are entitled to intervene in particular ways for particular ends. An
investigation of authorizations therefore examines how authorities of
various kinds seek to delineate a domain for their authority and to establish
the appropriate relationship between their domain and those of other
authorities.
Finally one cannot help but be struck by the heterogeneity of authorities
involved in governance. A bewildering array of authorities seeks to govern
conduct in any given field of human affairs. In the field of co1porate social
responsibility, fQr example, the list of actual and would-be authorities
ranges from politicians, judges, regulators, diplomats and UN officials to
business managers, public relations consultants, academics, scientists,
activists, environmental NGOs, labour leaders, celebrities, pundits and
news editors. These authorities often have widely different social and
cognitive commitments, perceive their positions and interests according to
divergent discourses and pursue conflicting inteq>retations, aims and .
agendas (Hajer 1995, pp. 13, 65). To ,be successful, authorizations must
enable diverse authorities to communicate with each other and with
governed subjects. Such communication enables linkages and alliances
which authorities can turn to their own ends. As a result authorizations are
not simply a matter of the utterances of individual authorities. Like
problematizations, they are collective. They contribute to the construction
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of a set of story lines, shared vocabularies, ethical principles and mutually
intelligible explanatory logics, a 'zone of intelligible contestation' within
which different authorities make sense of messy realities and pursue their
various projects (Rose 1999, p. 28; cf. Rose and Miller 1992; Hajer 1995).

· Authorizing Environmental Management Systems
Who are the authorities seeking to establish and secure respect for their
authority in the field of environmental management systems? Since EMSs
have become so closely identified with ISO and the ISO 14000 standards,
one might be forgiven for assuming that ISO itself is the main authority in
the field of global EMS standards. It is certainly the most visible entity in
this field. It is a 'bricks and mortar' organization with a headquarters and
.permanent secretariat in Geneva. It is the premier global standardization
body. Yet ISO is highly decentralized, with most of its work dispersed
among hundreds of technical committees, thousands of working groups and
tens of thousands of volunteer experts dispersed around the globe and
operating in relative autonomy from the central organization. It is not
partictilarly helpful to think of ISO as an authority, let alone the authority in
the area of EMSs. ISO is better viewed as an institutional setting within
which various authorities pursue their governance ambitions. 11
Such authorities include representatives of national and transnational
industry groups; corporate environmental, health, safety and quality
managers; professional standards writers and officials of standardization
bodies; environmental management system auditors and registrars;
management consultants from consultancies of all types and sizes; lawyers,
accountants and other professional business advisors; and officials of
government trade and industry ministries. These actors make up what might
be considered a core transnational coalition of authorities who have
developed, promoted and implemented EMSs and EMS standards.
Numerous other actors also seek to exercise authority in the EMS field.
These include consumer and environmental groups, representatives of
national environment ministries and officials of international organizations
such as the European Commission. In the experience of many of these
actors, 'big business' interests from advanced industrialized countries
dominate the coalition while developing country interests, small business,
public authorities and environmental groups are marginalized or excluded
(for example, Krut and Gleckman 1998).
What one finds, in short, is a variety of authorities seeking to govern the
conduct of a variety of actors through a variety of means. This transnational
coalition is held together not by shared interests, goals or strategies but by
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its employment of a particular set of claims and story lines - a particular
discourse - about the character of the environmental problem and the
appropriate tools an~l.~to~. to address it (Hajer 1995, pp. 12-13, 58-68;
Salskov-Iversen, Hansen and Bislev 2000). Continual invocation of these
discursive elemeiiiS-·iielps to. establish ·and ·sustain the authority of EMSs,
EMS standards and the institutions, such as ISO, that develop and
implement them.
Delineation of a Distinctive Domain for EMSs and Standardization
The principal way in which EM:S discourse seeks to establish the authority
of EMSs is by locating environmental management and standardization in a
technical domain, insulated both from the conflict of politics and, to an
extent, the naked competition of the market This is no surprise considering
the cultural context in which EMSs emerged EMSs emerged out of a
community of professionals - environmental managers, engineers,
accountants, quality managers, management consultants - who understand
themselves primarily as technicians. Their concern is to devise and operate
the technica:l tools an organization needs to achieve its goals and fulfill its
legal and other obligations. To this community an environmental ·
management system is just such a technical tool.
When a demand arose for uniform guidelines for EMSs, the obvious
institutions to develop such guidelines were standardization bodies, the
organizations responsible for the quality management system standards and
other technical standards around which much of these professionals'
working lives revolved. Submitting the development of EMS guidelines to
these institutions reflected and reinforced the conceptualization of these
matters as 'technical'.
It is useful to think of the delineation of a technical domain of authority
for EMSs as proceedmg simultaneously in four directions: first, EMSs and
standardization are characterized as technical rather than political; second,
the pursuit of commercial self-interest is characterized as having no place in
standardization; third, EMSs are characterized as neutral and universally
applicable tools; and fourth, EMSs and standardization put in place a
specialized language, mastery of which is essential for effective ·
participation in the discourse.
The Expulsion of Politics
One of the central tactics in establishing a domain of authority for EMSs
and standardization is to insist that they occupy an apolitical space. Politics
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is imagined to occur in an external, 'public' domain. The implementation
and operation of an EMS and the development and application of EMS
standards are understood as technical matters. ISO 1400 l and 14004
'depoliticize' environmental management in various ways, for example by
giving each organization the sole authority to decide its acceptable
environmental impacts and the appropriate degree of public transparency in
managing those impacts (Wood 2002-03, 2003). Standardization bodies
such as ISO are characterized as apolitical institutions whose mission is to
produce the 'best solutions' for various technical problems (for example,
Wraight 2003). Standards development, which ISO calls its 'technical
work', is done by 'technical experts' under the aegis of 'Technical
Committees' which are ultimately supervised by a 'Technical Management
Board' (ISO 2003a, undated a). Conflicts about public health,
environmental quality, competitiveness, corporate accounta}>ility and
dominance among competing firms or trading blocs are acted out as if they
were merely technical matters (see Salter 1993-94, p. 106). The
standardization community consciously declines to characterize conflicting
industry interests as 'political' (Salter 1993-94, p. 113), while frequently
describing governments and public interest groups by contrast, as
,
'politically oriented bodies' (Cascio 1996b, p. 10).
Of course EMSs, like other codes of corporate conduct, involve stakes
that are understood as political by many observers. As one commentator
writes, 'the evaluation of environmental impacts, and the development of
standards for acceptable firm behavior, are not neutral technical decisions
but policy judgments' (Robt-Arriaza 1995a, p. 522). It is a mark of
sophistication in this discourse coalition to acknowledge that the opposition
between the technical and the political is slippery. Participants in ISO TC
207 .frequently acknowledge the political stakes of EMSs and EMS
standards by, for example, asserting that EMSs contribute to the
achievement of public policy goals such as sustainable development;
recognizing that EMS standards must keep pace with the changing
expectations of governments, public interest groups and other actors outside
the business community; and acknowledging that standards development
ought to involve more effective participation by such actors.
So there is an ambivalence about the relation between the 'technical' and
the 'political'. Yet this ambivalence is usually resolved in a way that
reaffirms the expulsion of politics from the domain of_ EMSs and
standardization. The way EMSs deal with official law and policy is a good
illustration. ISO 14001 treats official legal and political systems as a special
element of the EMS 's external environment. An EMS internalizes official
law and policy by translating them into internal management system
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requirements and treating them much like any other performance parameter.
Yet it does so in a way that reinforces the expulsion of political contestation
from the domain of the EMS. It reaffirms the primacy of the state as
lawmaker: only the state has the authority to define collective
environmental values and goals and to translate these into binding legal
requirements. Indeed it has a responsibility to do so. Individual
.. organizations, by contrast, have neither the authority nor the responsibility
to make.such collective value judgments. Individual organizations can only
make decisions based on their own needs and priorities. Some EMS
proponents expressly defend the decision to leave substantive
environmental performance targets to individual organizations on the basis
that for a standardization body to set substantive performance requirements
would be an invasion of states' sovereign rights to determine the
environmental rules applicable in their jurisdictions {for example, Cascio,
Woodside and Mitchell 1996, p. 14; Bell 1997a). In affirming the authority
of official law and policy, therefore, EMSs and EMS standards reinforce the
existence of a domain reserved for apolitical, technical management It is in
this domain that an EMS operates, erecting a barrier between the
organization' and its politico-legal environment and arrogating exclusive
authority to the organization itself within this internal domain.

Ambivalence Toward the Market
The rise of 'private' authority in contemporary affairs is often identified
closely with the rise of the 'market' and themes · such as competition,
entrepreneurialism, consumer choice and free trade. Certainly the market
figures prominently in the discourse and practice of EMSs and
standardization, but the expulsion of politics from the domain of EMSs and
standardization does not imply a wholesale embrace of the market instead.
On the one hand the market supplies one of the central foundations for
the authority of EMSs and standardization. First, the market is understood
as a principal driver of EMS adoption: it will signal when and to what
extent an organi:zation should implement an EMS, whether the EMS should
be certified and whether and to what ·extent the organization should be
rewarded or punished for having done or not done these things. Second, the
market is portrayed as a principal driver of standardization. As ISO
maintains, 'ISO develops only those standards which are required by the
market' {ISO 1998, unpaginated). 12 ISO competes with other
standardization bodies. The success of its standards is judged in the
marketplace, in the form of firms' decisio~ to purchase and implement
particular standards. Third, standards are thought to foster healthy markets
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by reducing trade barriers, creating a level playing field for competition and
encouraging comparability and interchangeability. Fourth, the auditors and
registrars who assess conformity to standards and certify organizations or
products compete with each other for business.
On the other hand standardization discourse also seeks to temper the
logic of the market by insisting that self-interested economic competition
has no place in standards development. Participants in standards
development are expected, and regularly reminded, that they should not
seek competitive advantage for their preferred technologies, processes or
products or their own firms, countries or regions. 13 Standards should not
erect barriers to market entry or to international trade. Rather they should be
market neutral, embodying the 'best solution' to particular technical
problems (Wraight 2003). Nonetheless standardization participants
routinely pursue their own commercial self-interest, keeping an eye on their
competitors and seeking outcomes that will benefit their own competitive
positions. The vehemence with which standardization officials insist on
expelling self-interested market behaviour from standards development
reflects the pervasiveness and intractability of such behaviour.
This tendency to embrace the market as a driver and judge of EMSs and
standards and yet to expel it from the 'purely technical' task of standard$
development may seem contradictory, but it is not. The main reason for
expelling market competition from the task of standards development is to
ensure the healthy functioning of the market (for example, Wraight 2003).
This is· the same logic that informs many state interventions in the
economy: some matters must be withdrawn or insulated from the market in
order for the market to function properly.
'Marketization' and 'technicatization' have both been employed to
demobilize political contestation in modem societies. They are usually
understood to reflect different ideological commitments and political
programs. 'Technicalization' is usually associated with welfare state
liberalism (for example, social insurance schemes), while 'marketization' is
commonly associated with neoliberalism (for example, privatization and
competition in public service provision) (Rose and Miller 1992, pp. 196201 ). Interestingly EMSs and standardization share both tendencies. They
depoliticize corporate environmental management by treating it
simultaneously as a 'technical' matter to be resolved by the application of
apparently neutral technique, and as a matter of commercial preference to
be resolved by the exercise of autonomous choice in markets. If nothing
else, this indicates some of the complexity that exists in encounters between
welfarist and neoliberal mentalities in contemporary governance.
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Neutrality and Universality
A third tactic in establishing the authority ofEMSs and standards is to insist
upon their neutrality and universality. EMSs originated and remain
concentrated in environmentally destructive industry sectors such as
manufacturing, natural resources and chemicals. Yet it is an article of faith
in the EMS community that EMSs are applicable to organizations of any
kind, any size, anywhere, whether governmental or non-governmental,
public or private, for-profit or not-for-profit. ISO 1400 l purports 'to be
applicable to all types and sizes of organizations and to accommodate
diverse geographical, cultural and social conditions' (ISO 1996a, p. v}. This
includes all business sectors, from mining and manufacturing to banking,
tourism and farmfug. Beyond the business world it extends to universities,
hospitals, charitable foundations, municipal government bodies, military
bases, government agencies and Aboriginal communities (on the latter, see
Evers 2000). Organizations implementing EMSs may be big or small,
sophisticated or simple. Wherever organizations of any kind seek to manage
their environmental impacts, EMSs have a place.
This is possible because the ISO 14000 standards are rigorously
indifferent to the political, economic and cultural context. ISO embraces a
resolutely globalist ethic: 'It seems self-evident that any document called an
International Standard must possess, as a fundamental attribute, global
relevance. Equally, it must be free of regional or sectorial bias' (Wraight
2003). An EMS based on ISO 14001 or 14004 is an empty vessel, a valueneutral framework to be filled with whatever environmental priorities the
implementing organization prefers (subject, of course, to the commitments
to legal compliance and continual improvement). This neutrality enables
many of the more skeptical members of the EMS discourse coalition, such
as environmental groups and environmental regulators, to support EMSs.
To these skeptics ISO 14001 's·process-oriented neutrality means that it can
accommodate the highest standards of environmental performance or public
accountability, if organizations so choose or can be persuaded to do so. In
this way the neutrality of EMSs and EMS standards is a key assumption
across the discourse coalition.
This myth of neutrality and universality does not correspond well with
experience, however. Although they have spread to other places and other
kinds of organizations, EMSs remain concentrated in large, 'Northern',
traditionally high-environmental-impact industrial firms and their supply
chains. The development of international standards remains primarily the
preserve of participants from the advanced industrialized countries. ISO
14001 's universality myth also masks other important disparities. To the
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uninitiated, an organization's adoption of ISO 1400 l means that it has
achieved a certain uniform standard of environmental stewardship. But the
fact that an organization has an ISO 14001 EMS says very little about its
social or environmental commitments and performance. It may be a leader
in environmental and social responsibility or it may reluctantly be doing the
absolute minimum. ISO 14001 allows vast differences in environmental and
social performance. While this can easily be explained by an EMS expert, it
is likely lost on the majority of people who encounter ISO 14001. What one
has, then, is diversification of environmental and social priorities and
performance in the guise of standardization of management techniques. 14
The myth of globalism and neutrality provides a powerful rationale for a
never-ending proselytizing mission to advance the spread of management
systems in business firms, governments and civil society organizations
around the world. One EMS advocate writes that you cannot support or
oppose ISO 14001 any more than you would support or oppose a hammer
since, like a hammer, ISO 14001 is simply a neutral tool whose value
depends on how it is used (Bell 1997a, 1997b). Another EMS expert
disagrees, saying:
. .. we must first dispose of the idea that any management tool is neutral, and
only as good as the manager that uses it Even that most basic of tools beloved of
engineers worldwide, the hammer, comes in a variety of shapes and sizes. It is ·
certainly possible to choose an inappropriate version for the job in hand
(Sheldon I 997b, p. 15).

This argument is fine but it misses a larger point: when you're holding a
hammer, everything tends to look like a nail. Governance techniques
inculcate in both governors and governed certain modes of perception,
roles, practices and ways of carrying on. They shape, in a subtle way, how
we see our world, act upon it and in turn are acted upon (Rose 1999). A ·
management system, Viewed as a governance technology, begins to make
all issues look like technical matters to be identified, planned and managed
through its purportedly neutral managerial techniques. Hence the
proselytizing zeal of management system proponents: for the converted,
management systems are almost self-evidently appropriate for every issue
facing every organization in every context.
In these respects EMSs and standardization recapitulate a familiar story
of globalization. Like other contemporary globalisms including science,
international law, human rights, economic development, free trade and
'good governance', the universalist ethos of EMSs and standardization is an
example of a 'globalized localism' (Santos 1995). EMSs and
standardization are technologies of large, 'Northern', bureaucratic,
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hierarchical business organizations, imbued with the values of technocratic
management and global free trade that have served their makers so well.
While these localisms are made to appear universal, neutral and
indispensable for progress everywhere, the local knowledge, practices,
peoples, modes of governance and ways of carrying on that are subject to
these globalizing projects are ignored, devalued, marginalized or erased.
A Specialized Language
Finally language itself is a powerful tool for the demarcation and
consolidation of zones of authority. . The authority of science, medicine,
psychology, law and other expert disciplines and professions relies partly
on specialized vocabularies and languages. In many fields mastery of a
specialized language and vocabulary is essential for knowledgeable
communication, effective participation and the exercise of authority.
To have authority in the domain of EMS standards one must master, or at
least be competent in, the specialized languages of standardization and
environmental management systems. Standardization is carried out in a
specialized language that is full of peculiar terminology and nomenclature.
EMSs in turn have their own highly specialized vocabulary and language.
The result is a bewildering array of acronyms, terms of art and other
linguistic devices with which I will not bore the reader. Suffice it to say that
fluency with these specialized vocabularies is a prerequisite for the
'technical expertise' that confers discursive authority in this domain. Such
fluency is usually gained through extended immersion in the professional
·
cultures of environmental management and standardization.
Not swprisingly this tends to privilege actors who are already fluent in
these specialized languages, including corporate environmental managers,
management consultants, environmental auditors and standardization
professionals. The lack of such -fluency is experienced by many actors,
including representatives of small business and developing countries, as a
serious obstacle to participation. This is true, for instance, for many
environmental or consumer groups whose broad mandates and limited
resources require them to remain generalists and prevent them from fully
entering these specialized discourse communities even if they desire to
participate.
One interesting feature of the specialized language of EMSs is that it is
shot through · with ambiguities and at best partially resolved conflicts.
Almost every major term of art found in ISO 14001, including 'prevention
of pollution', 'continual improvement' and the. 'commitment to compliance'
conceals such conflicts and ambiguities. This became clear in the revision
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of ISO 14001 and 14004, which began in 2000 and is expected to conclude
in 2004. Partially submerged disagreements over the meaning of key terms
surfaced repeatedly during the revision process. For example ISO 14001
requires an organization to identify and manage those environmental
aspects that it 'can control and over which it .can be expected to have an
influence' (ISO 1996a, clause 4.3.l). Some participants, mainly from
Western Europe, interpreted this phrase to require an organization to
manage all environmental aspects over which it has some influence up and
down its supply chain, from raw materials extraction to end-of-life disposal.
Other participants, mainly from North America, insisted that ISO 14001
only requires organizations to manage environmental aspects within their
immediate control (for example, the activities of on-site contractors) and
does not require them to undertake environmental supply chain
management. This was ultimately resolved by a classic ISO 14000 tactic:
recognizing that each organization has sole authority to decide which
environmental aspects are within its influence. 15
While these sorts of conflicts and ambiguities should come as no
surprise, the irony should still be apparent: a specialized language of
technical management that promises to expel political contestation from its
domain in fact crystallizes such contestation in the unresolved ambiguities.
of its own vocabulary.
Conclusion
An analysis of codes of corporate conduct should be alert to the strategies
and tactics employed to establish, consolidate or contest the authority of
codes and their proponents. In the case of EMSs and standardization, the
principal authorization tactic is to delineate a tranquil, technical domain
insulated from the messy world of political contestation and, to an extent,
market competition. This delineation is characterized by ambivalence and
tension, even if its overall effect is fairly clear. One of the tasks of an
analysis of codes of corporate conduct is to attend to such complexities
because they have subtle implications for thought and action, as I have
attempted to outline above.

CAN WE MAKE SENSE OF CORPORATE CODES IN
TERMS OF AN OPPOSITION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE?
The third question we should ask about codes of corporate conduct is
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whether we can make sense of them in terms of a public/private dichotomy.
Of course questioning the public/private divide is nothing new. What I
would like to suggest is that the answer to this question is more complicated
than we might have thought. The public/private divide remains fundamental
to the way codes of corporate conduct are conceptualized, yet it fails to
correspond to, and indeed obscures, the ways in which authority is actually
exercised in this field. So we can make sense of codes partially in terms of a
public/private divide insofar as that is how many codes are conceptualized;
but we also need to look past this conceptual opposition to the complexity
of practice to get a fuller sense of the significance of codes.
Rethinking the Public/Private Divide
Codes of corporate conduct are often portrayed as a new form of
governance that signals the demise or at least transformation of
conventional state regulation and defies the conventional categories of
political thought. As many students of contemporary governance have
observed, 'the political vocabulary structured by oppositions between state
and civil society, public and private, government and market, coercion and
consent, sovereignty and autonomy and the like, does not adequately
characterise the diverse ways in which rule is exercised' (Rose and Miller
1992, p. 174). It fails to capture the complex interpenetration and
hybridization of actors, domains and practices conventionally understood as
public or private, state or non-state, coercive or voluntary. The discourse of
corporate codes often acknowledges the slipperiness of these conventional
dichotomies, admitting that 'private' or 'technical' initiatives have 'public'
or 'political' implications, that the public/private distinction is blurry and
shifting, that many 'voluntary' codes are not genuinely voluntary or that
legal systems and voluntary codes are highly intertwined (for example,
Webb 1999; Morrison, Cushing, Day and Speir 2000, pp. 8-10; Haufler
2001; Meidinger 2001; Webb forthcoming).
Nonetheless EMS standards and other codes of corporate conduct
continue to be understood and debated largely in terms of the same
conceptual oppositions and the same fascination with the state that have
structured political thought throughout much of the modem period. The
entire literature on corporate codes, despite its purported focus on non-state
governance, exhibits a deep fascination with the character, possibilities,
powers, abuses and limits of the state. The relation of corporate codes to
states and law is an ever present theme, and it is almost always
conceptualized in terms of familiar dichotomies such as public versus
private. Codes of corporate conduct are usually portrayed as 'private'

Codes: Problematizations, Authorizations and the PUblic/Private Divide 269
initiatives undertaken by private authorities, operating in modes and spaces
distinct from the 'public' sphere of official politics and law and involving,
for better or worse, a privatization of governance (for example, Cutler,
Haufler and Porter 1999; Webb, forthcoming; in the case of EMS standards,
see Roht-Arriaza 1995a and 1995b; Reiley 1997; Gunningham 1997-98;
Clapp 1998; Meidinger 1999; Murray 1999; Pezzoli 2000; Haufler 2001).
Even when codes of corporate conduct are developed by state authorities
they are typically conceived as attempts by 'public' authorities to foster or
regulate 'private' initiative. 16
As a result even if the conventional categories of political thought are
often stretched or blurred, they still provide the basic framework for
identifying and understanding corporate codes. This is particularly puzzling
if we consider that attacks on the received categories of public, private,
state, sovereignty, market and so on have been central features of ~ocial and
political criticism for close to a century, if not longer. Proclaiming the
retreat or demise of the state, law, sovereignty or the public sphere and
proposing some revision of traditional conceptual categories has become
part of the ritual of renewal in discipline after discipline (for example,
Kennedy 2000). Why is it, then, that the sovereign state and the received
conceptual categories of politics continue to exercise such an influence over~.
our imaginations even in an era when events repeatedly challenge their
relevance? Why have we still not 'cut off the king's head', so to speak, in
the field of political thought? (Foucault 1978, pp. 88-9).
Perhaps it is because governance continues to need its 'kings' (see Dillon
1995). The problem of the state - its potentialities, limits and excesses remains a central preoccupation of political thought (Rose and Miller 1992).
The public/private dichotomy and other familiar binary oppositions are
deeply ingrained in the structure of modem western knowledge (for
example, Koskenniemi 1989; Walker 1993; Charlesworth 1999, 2002;
Wood 2004). They remain basic building blocks of governance projects
generally and codes of corporate conduct in particular. This does not mean,
however, that an analysis of codes of corporate conduct should simply
accept these conceptual categories at face value. The task of analysis is to
investigate how these categories and their interrelations are produced and
reproduced and how they are employed in particular governance projects.
Applying this insight to codes of corporate conduct leads quickly to a
puzzle. At the level·of deliberate discourse, corporate codes are conceived,
championed or opposed largely in terms of received conceptuiil categories
including the public/private dichotomy. Yet, at the level of practice, these
oppositions break down in a complex web of hybridization and
interpenetration. The analysis of codes of corporate conduct should
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examine this disjuncture between discourse and practice. It should
investigate how, at the level of discourse, categories such as public and
private are constructed and pressed into the service of particular
governmental agendas. It should investigate whether and how these
categories overlap, hybridize, merge or collapse in practice. · Finally it
should consider what these disjunctures and conjunctures between
dis~ourse and practice imply for the governance of corporate conduct.

Environmental Management Systems and the Public/Private Divide
The EMS discourse coalition converges around two propositions: that
EMSs and standards are primarily 'private' initiatives and that one of the
most pressing concerns raised by these initiatives is how they should relate
to the 'public' sphere of the state. For many supporters the ISO 14000 EMS
standards represent innovative, market-driven alternatives to ineffective,
costly and coercive state regulation (for example, Cascio 1996a; Lally
1998). In this view EMSs and standards occupy a private, technical,
apolitical domain that is and should be insulated from the messy, rigid and
inefficient public arena of official politics and law. For many critics, on the
other hand, the ISO 14000 EMS standards reflect the private interests of
global business and are a species of corporate greenwash which threatens to
lead public authorities to abdicate their responsibility to regulate business in
the public interest (for example, Gleckman and. Krut 1997; Krut and
Gleckman 1998; Parto 1999).
What supporters and critics have in common is the assumption that
EMSs represent a 'private' mode of environmental governance · (for
example, Robt-Arriaza 1995b; Reiley 1997; Clapp 1998; Murray 1999;
Pezzoli 2000; Haufler 2001 ). ISO standards are understood as private sector
initiatives, devel~ped by and for business outside the regulatory apparatus
of the state (for example, ISO 1998; IEC 2000). This view is shared
throughout the EMS discourse coalition, from industry representatives to
environmentalists to government officials. Disagreement centres on such
questions as whether such a privatization of environmental goverruince is
desirable, what form it should take, how it should be supervised and by
whom and how it should relate to the 'public' sphere of official politics and
law. At the level of discourse, then, the public/private dichotomy is
deployed both to establish and challenge the authority of EMSs and EMS
standards.
In practice, however, 'public' and 'private' actors, institutions and
domains are commingled to such an extent that it is simply not useful to
describe EMS initiatives in terms of a public/private divide. EMS discourse,
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couched as it is in terms of a public/private dichotomy, prevents us from
appreciating the extent and complexity of these entanglements or exploring
their implications. One way to get a clearer sense of these entanglements is
to take stock of the ways in which actors conventionally understood as
'public authorities' - such as elected politicians, legislatures, government
ministers, departments, agencies, bureaucrats, inspectors, public
procurement personnel, military forces, judges, prosecutors, administrative
tribunals, local governments, public utilities and international institutions engage with the ostensibly 'private' domain ofEMSs and EMS standards.
Public authorities at all levels - national, subnational and international are deeply entangled in the constitution and exercise of 'private' authority
in the field of environmental management systems. I suggest that we can
view their engagements with EMS initiatives, and with codes of corporate
conduct more generally, as falling into eight categories, which might be
labelled 'steering', 'self-discipline', 'knowledge generation', 'reward',
'command', 'borrowing', 'benchmarking' and 'challenge' (Wood 2002-03,
2003). 17
'Steering' refers to a range of ways in which public authorities attempt to
influence, directly or indirectly, the development, use or content of
voluntary codes of conduct. First, public authorities are deeply involved in
the constitution and operation of standardization bodies, a fact that has been
largely overlooked in debates about corporate codes. The majority of ISO
member bodies are actually government agencies. Governments in many
countries oversee national standardization bodies, fund their work, sit on
their governing organs or publish their standards. Numerous governments
have sought to exercise strategic leadership in standardization by
implementing national standardization strategies (for example, Standards
Council of Canada 2000). 18 The mandate, organizational structure and basic
functions of many standardization bodies are set out in legislation enacted
by governments. Aside from these supervisory functions, government
officials often participate directly in standards development work. 19 Public
authorities of various kinds, domestic and international, participated
actively - albeit in small numbers - in the development of the ISO 14000
standards.
Another way in which public authorities attempt to steer voluntary codes
of conduct is by making statements designed to encourage, inhibit or shape
the use of codes. Many public authorities 'talk the talk' of EMSs, endorsing
and promoting the use of EMSs among industry. Others are more
circumspect, acknowledging the benefits of EMSs but enunciating concerns
or setting out conditions for public authorities' support for such initiatives
(for example, North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation
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2000). Public authorities in the advanced industrialized countries have
typically expressed concerns about whether EMS implementation will
result in improved environmental performance, legal compliance or public
accountability, while developing country authorities are typically more
concerned that EMS standards may become de facto trade barriers.
In the examples given in the previous paragraphs, public authorities
attempt to steer the development and use of voluntary codes 'at a distance',
as it were (see Rose and Miller 1992; Grabosky 1995; Rose 1999, pp. 4950). Such efforts are risky and their results uncertain (for example, Webb
1999). Some public authorities seek to intervene more directly by
developing voluntary codes themselves. The example par excellence in the
EMS field is the European Union's Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
(EMAS) (Council of the European Communities 1993). EMAS, which was
established by regulation, is a voluntary programme in which participating
firms implement an environmental management system, conduct regular
environmental audits, issue annual public reports on their environmental
performance and have their EMSs and environmental reports verified by an
independent third party. Wbile going this route might give public
authorities more influence over the content of voluntary codes, it does not,
of course, guarantee acceptance or implementation by the target audience.
'Steering' in any form is prone to failures and unintended consequences.
'Self-discipline' occurs when public authorities subject themselves to
voluntary codes of conduct. First, many public authorities around the world
do not just 'talk the EMS talk' but 'walk the walk' by implementing EMSs
in their own operations. Thousands of public sector organizations have done
so, from local governments to international organizations, from individual
sites to entire departments, from waste treatment operations to military
bases. A growing number of central government authorities either
encourage or require their departments and agencies to implement EMSs. 20
Second, governments may 'lash themselves to the mast' of voluntary codes
by enacting laws or signing international treaties that require them to u8e
voluntary standards developed by recognized standardization bodies. such as
ISO as the basis for their own regulations. Under the 1994 Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, member states must base their mandatory
technical regulations on voluntary standards developed by international
standardization bodies, subject to narrowly defined exceptions.21
Regulations that deviate from such standards may be, and have been,
challenged as international trade barriers. A similar legal rule is found at the
national level in the United States.22 While the full implications of these
disciplines have yet to be realized, it is possible that if and when public
authorities seek to promulgate mandatory EMS regulations, existing
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voluntary standards such as ISO 1400 I will become constraints on their
authority to design their own laws.
'Knowledge production' refers to situations where public authorities
generate or disseminate knowledge about the design, use or value of EMSs
or other codes of conduct Many public authorities, both domestic and
international, lend their imprimatur to EMS-related knowledge by
disseminating how-to guidance on EMS design and implementation,
offering EMS training courses, publicizing the benefits of EMSs,
sponsoring EMS pilot projects or funding EMS-related research (for
example, Andrews et al. 2001 ).
'Reward' occurs when public authorities provide organizations with
material incentives to ·adhere to the terms of voluntary codes of conduct. In
the case of EMSs, such rewards typically take three forms. The first is
regulatory flexibility, which involves relaxation of existing ~egulatory
requirements or forbearance from introducing new ones for firms that
implement EMSs. Such incentives may be incorporated in firm- or sectorspecific negotiated agreements, generalized regulatory incentive
programmes or relaxed environmental enforcement policies.23 Second,
many public authorities provide modest financial incentives including
grants and tax incentives to firms that implement EMSs or obtain EMS ,
certification.24 Third, public authorities may modify their procurement
policies to encourage, prefer or even require suppliers to have EMSs or be
ISO 14001-certified.25
'Command' refers to the comparatively rare situation in which public
authorities require regulated entities to adhere to the terms of otherwise
voluntary codes of conduct. This can take several forms, but it is worth
noting that both industry and government usually resist proposals to make
EMSs mandatory. Courts in a few countries, including Canada, have
ordered firms to implement EMSs or obtain ISO 14001 certification upon
conviction for environmental offences or in settlement of charges.26 A
handful of jurisdictions, mainly in the developing world but including two
Canadian provinces, have enacted legislation requiring firms in certain
sectors to implement or obtain certification of EMSs.27 Such judicial or
legislative action has almost always been with the consent of the affected
firms or their trade associations (Saxe 2000). Another way voluntary codes
can be converted to legally binding commands is through civil lawsuits. A
growing number of supply contracts, trade association membership
agreements and other commercial arrangements require parties to
implement EMSs. Parties aggrieved by breaches of these agreements might
sue in contract, tort or intellectual property law. To the extent that courts
allow such actions, the terms of these agreements may effectively become
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legally binding 'commands' (for example, Webb 1999; Meidinger 2001).
'Command' is just one way to incorporate voluntary codes into legal
systems; 'Borrowing' refers to a range of other ways in which public
authorities might Incorporate voluntary codes of conduct in legal
instruments such as statutes, regulations, permits or international
agreements. Standards developed by standardization bodies such as ISO
play a . prominent role here. Public authorities have a long history of
'borrowing' voluntary technical standards for the purposes of official
regulation. Legal instruments such as statutes, regulations, permits and fire
codes may reproduce the terms of a voluntary standard verbatim or may
incorporate them indirectly by, for instance, specifying implementation of a
voluntary standard as a default basis for approvals, making violation of a
voluntary standard the trigger for statutory duties or authorizing the use of a
voluntary standard for testing, inspecting or measuring a regulated entity's
activities or products (for example, Hamilton 1978). The new EMAS II
regulation, for instance, incorporates the text of ISO 14001 as the EMS
component of its voluntary eco-management and audit scheme, rather than
specifying its own EMS standard (Council of the ..European Community
2001).
'
'Benchmarking' occurs when a court or tribunal uses a voluntary code of
conduct as a benchmark for evaluating a party's conduct and determining
28
its legal liability. Courts frequently use voluntary standards in this way,
especially if they have achieved the status of industry custom. In a common
law jurisdiction, a judge might treat a defendant's implementation of an
ISO 1400 l EMS as evidence of 'reasonable care' in a negligence action or
'due diligence' in a regulatory enforcement action (Taylor 1998;
Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable Development 1999;
Webb 1999; Saxe 2000; Meidinger 2001). Voluntary codes might thereby
be imposed on firms that take no part in their development or use, giving
them a power they could not achieve·on their own (Webb 1999).
Finally the term 'challenge' is used to describe those situations in which
public authorities issue a public challenge to firms to adhere to voluntary
codes of conduct Such challenge programmes have been popular with
public authorities who wish industry to address environmental issues such
as greenhouse gases or hazardous pollutants, but who are for various
reasons reluctant to introduce new regulatory requirements. There do not
appear to be any examples, to date, of such public challenges being issued
in relation to EMSs.
My purpose in proposing this catalogue is not to set down a definitive
classification of interactions between p~blic authorities and voluntary
codes. Like many other typologies, this one is tentative, incomplete,
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oversimplified and somewhat idiosyncratic. Its usefulness lies mainly in its
ability to convey some sense of the extent and complexity of public
authorities' involvement in the 'private' domain of environmental
management systems. It helps to demonstrate that while the public/private
dichotomy and other familiar conceptual categories continue to structure
EMS discourse, they are simply inadequate to capture the diverse ways in
which authority is exercised in this field.
This misalignment between discourse and practice is significant for a
number of reasons, but for present purposes I wish to focus on just one: it
inhibits more robust engagements by public authorities with EMS
initiatives. Despite their myriad entanglements with EMS initiatives, many
public authorities continue to insist that EMSs and ISO 14001 are and
should remain private, market-driven initiatives. They continue to
characterize their own roles in this field in terms of a public/private divide.
By doing so they contribute to the construction of EMSs and
standardization as occupying a self-organizing, apolitical private sphere in
which the role of public authorities is to intervene selectively at the margins
to vindicate 'public' values such as transparency, public accountability,
environmental protection, human rights and the rule of law. This is as much
an acknowledgment of the limited scope of the 'public' sphere as it is al).
extension of public authority into the operation of 'private' spaces.
This way of thinking and acting about environmental management shares
an ambivalence that is found at the heart of modem governance: a tension
between the wish to delimit certain autonomous domains outside the
legitimate bounds of political rule and simultaneously to govern these
domains S() as to foster their beneficial self-organizing capacities (Rose
1999, pp. 49-50). In the contemporary period this mentality leads many
public authorities, along with ' public interest' advocates such as
environmentalists, to take a tragic view of EMSs and standardization in
which the state's r9le is to guard the integrity of a public sphere which,
despite their efforts, is shrinking in the face of globalization, neoliberalism,
corporate power and other contemporary forces. This stance paradoxically
affirms the existence of a public sphere for politics while effectively
restricting or demobilizing the possibilities for a meaningful politics outside
this shrinking sphere (see Kennedy 2001). This inhibiting effect is likely to
continue so long as public authorities and other actors continue to
conceptualize, rationalize and challenge each others' roles in this field in
terms of a public/private divide.
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CONCLUSION: DOING THE 'HOUSEWORK OF
CAPITALISM'
In a world of mundane mechanisms for governing everyday life, EMSs and
standardization distinguish themselves as particularly mundane. Even in the
boardrooms of the firms that implement them, standards are 'usually
considered a ''MEGO" ("my eyes glaze over") subject' (Sheldon l 997b, p.
11 ). EMSs. and standards are essentially invisible to all but those directly
involved in their design and implementation. They are inserted into the
detailed, everyday routines of countless factories, offices and organizations.
They operate at the capillary level (Foucault 1980, p. 39): at the
innumerable points in space and time where managers make decisions,
workers .carry out standard operating procedures, technicians calibrate
equipment, equipment measures and records data, personnel collect,
calculate and interpret those data, trainers train employees, individuals
make mistakes or deliberate decisions that result in planned or unplanned
environmental impacts, managers review reports and set priorities, auditors
inspect books and facilities, local residents complain about foul odours,
customers and suppliers negotiate contracts, insurers and creditors assess
risks and government inspectors knock at the door.
Standardization has been called 'the housework of capitalism' (Salter
1993-94). Like housework, it is 'detailed, mundane, repetitive, and never
completed' and 'both essential and unrecognized in the constitution and
reproduction of economic and class relationships' (Salter 1993-94, p. 107;
see also Ewald 1990, p. 152). It is inconspicuous, occurring almost entirely
out of the public eye in thousands of little known standards-setting bodies.
It purports to 'tidy up' production and exchange, imposing a modicum of
homogeneity and predictability on the messiness of the market and
facilitating, so it claims, the efficient running of the economy, just as
housework tidies the home and facilitates. the efficient running of the
household.
What standardization does for the economy, management systems do for
the firm. Like housework, an environmental management system provides a
collection of repetitive routines and processes for putting an organization's
environmental 'house' in order. It holds out the hope of turning an
organization's potentially chaotic and confusing interactions with its natural
and social environment into a series of orderly, everyday routines. The
'deceptively mundane nature' of an ISO 14001 EMS is driven home by one
commentator who writes that implementing the standard,
involves cutting through all of the rhetoric about environmental protection and
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sustainable development and figuring out what individuals must do, on a regular
and practical basis in their everyday jobs, to implement an organization's policy
and achieve its objectives and targets .. . This is a very simple concept: on every
single day, every person needs to know the correct thing to do at the right time,
and what to do differently in a timely fashion if circumstances change . .. (Bell
1997a, p. 10631)

Of course not all codes of corporate conduct are like EMSs and standards.
Not all codes problematize environmental conditions and corporate conduct .
in the ways I have described. Not all codes seek to ground their authority in
the claim that they are merely techriical responses to technical problems.
Not all codes construct the public/private divide in the same way that EMSs
and standardization do. Many codes, particularly those in which social,
environmental or consumer groups have played more influential roles,
reflect different problematizations (for instance problematizing industrial
capitalism as fundamentally inconsistent with ecological sustainability or
the corporation as fundamentally destructive and untrustworthy) and
authorizations (for instance grounding their authority in an expressly
politicized conception of the place of codes in the determination and pursuit
of environmental and democratic values), and reflect different
configurations of public and private domains. It would be a mistake to :
generalize the present case too far.
Nonetheless the significance of the problematizations, authorizations and
configurations of the public/private divide I have described extends beyond
EMSs and EMS standards. Numerous other voluritary codes of corporate
conduct, from corporate environmental reporting programmes to social
accountability standards to e-commerce codes to financial accounting
principles, exhibit the same techno-managerial mentalities. Characterizing
the environmental or social impacts of business as mundane technical
matters for systematic management is often an attractive tactic for the
business participants in such codes because it helps to insu.Iate corporate
conduct from the level of scrutiny it might otherwise attract.
The ISO 14000 EMS standards are a contemporary example of an
historic trend, observed since at least the early twentieth century: the
advance of a 'technicalizing' rationality in which more and more facets of
individual and collective life are removed from the domains of common
sense and political contestation and relocated onto the tranquil, humdrum,
purportedly objective territory of technical expertise. ISO 14001 's upbeat,
techno-managerial conception of how to govern business and the
environmental crisis is shared not only with some other voluntary codes of
corporate conduct but also with the dominant contemporary mentalities of
state-based regulation. As a result, despite their promise to transform
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corporate culture and environmental governance, EMS standards do not
represent much of a departure from prevailing approaches to environmental
regulation.
This does not mean, however, that EMSs and EMS standards are
insigriificant. First, EMSs and standardization are significant precisely
because they make your eyes glaze over, because they do the technical
'housework' of capitalism. They channel what might otherwise be intense
conflict into low-level, repetitive, technical routine. By demobilizing
struggles over poverty, jobs, competitiveness, trade, ecological integrity and
so on, standardization and EMSs consolidate the existing unequal power
relations that characterize these issue-areas and disguise their own role in
that consolidation by portraying these matters as if they were always
already private, apolitical, technical and routine.
Second, the deactivation of politics effected by governance mechanisms
such as EMSs and standardization will likely be one of the key challenges
in the 'post-regulatory' phase we appear to have entered (Black 2001; Scott
forthcoming). EMSs and standardization mute the political stakes of
environme~tal management at the same time that they position themselves
as agents of innovation and transformation in an era of historical rupture.
They purport to offer a pragmatic alternative to the increasingly apparent
failures and limitations of conventional state-centred modes and institutions
of government - an alternative that is simultaneously environmentally
friendly, economically profitable and capable, in partnership with modest
public authorities and inventive NGOs, of meeting the challenge of
sustainable development. And yet they beg the question of how we are to
preserve and expand a meaningful space for democratic politics a:s we
question the role of the state and accord increasing authority to purportedly
neutral and 'private' managerial techniques. This question will only become
more pressing as standardization bodies such as ISO extend the
management systems model into ever more fields of conduct, :from quality
and environmental management in the 1980s and 1990s to generalized
'sustainability' and 'corporate responsibility' management in the 2000s.29
Third, we must recognize that mundane, low-level, inconspicuous
mechanisms such as EMSs, standards and other humdrum techniques play a
more substantial ·role in governing corporate and individual conduct than
conventional analyses contemplate. If we wish to understand how we
govern and are governed, we must attend to the mundane, small and
unspectacular techniques and practices of rule that permeate our existence.
As Rose and Valverde urge in the context of legal studies, this means
turning away :from 'the canonical texts and the privileged sites' of politics
and law and toward, in their words,
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the minor, the mundane, the grey, meticulous and detailed work ... of all the
places where, in the bureaucratic workings of our over-governed existence, laws,
rules and standards shape our ways of going on, and all the little judges of
conduct exercise their petty powers of adjudication and enforcement (Rose and
Valverde 1998, p. 546).

These humdrum authorities and mechanisms are especially significant
because they are capable of shaping the conduct of individuals and
corporations at a minute and pervasive level which governments, human
rights activists and · environmental groups can usually only dream of
achieving. Paradoxically this is where the transformative potential of EMSs
and standardization might be hidden. If one could press management
systems or standardization into the service of different, more radical
governance agendas, what powerful tools for the governance of corporate
conduct they might prove to be. Whether and to what extent this is. possible
remains to be seen, however.
Finally let me return to the three questions I posed at the beginning of
this essay: what are the problems for which codes pose as solutions; how is
the authority of codes established; and whether we can make sense of codes
in terms of a public/private divide. These questions are important because
the problematizations, authorizations, and complex configurations of the .
public/private divide upon which codes rely shape the ways we think and
act about the governance of corporate conduct before we ever get to the
stage of asking the sorts of questions that typically preoccupy us, such as
the effectiveness, efficiency or legitimacy of codes or the processes by
which they are produced. Of course we should continue to ask the latter
questions, but we can no longer afford to neglect the former.

NOTES
l . Useful accounts of the history of environmental management systems and EMS
standardi7.ation include Orts (1995); Robt-Arriaza (1995a); Hall and Tockman (1995);
Cascio (1996a); Rodgers (1996); Bell (1997); Dodds (1997); Sheldon (1997a); Gleckman
and Krut (1997); Hortensius and Barthel (1997); Wolfe (1997); Starkey (1998); Meidinger
( 1999-2000); Morrison, Cushing, Day and Speir (2000) and Coglianese and Nash (200 I a).
2. 'ISO' is not an acronym but the Greek prefix meaning 'equal' (as in isobar or isotherm).
3. 'Interested parties' are any individuals or groups concerned with or affected by the
organi7.ation's environmental perfonnance (ISO l 996a and b, common clause 3.11 ). The
requirement to take external interested parties' views into account when setting internal
management goals goes farther than what is legally required in any jurisdiction of which I
am aware, but ISO 1400 l leaves it to each organi7.ation to identify its interested parties
and decide how to ascertain their views.
4. It must be noted, however, that the draft second edition of ISO 14004 puts more emphasis
on two-way dialogue and consultation than the original 1996 version does (ISO 2003b,
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29. Standardization bodies in several countries, including Australia, Austria, Brazil, Colombia,
France, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Spain and the United Kingdom have begu.n to develop
voluntaiy management systems standards for sustainability or coiporate social
responsibility (see for example Standards Australia 2003a, 2003b; AFNOR 2003). ISO bas
begun to explore the possibility of developing global standards in this area. An ISO
advisocy group on social responsibility is currently considering whether ISO should
develop generic coiporate social responsibility management standards. A decision on
whether to proceed and, if so, with what kind of standards, is expected by early 2005.
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